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Notes
LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT-THE KENTUCKY
LEGAL CONTEXT
In its continuing role as guardian of citizens' constitutional rights,
the Supreme Court'in Baker v. Carr' unlocked widespread concern for
equal representation in state legislatures. Having been suppressed for
two decades in which an amazing shift of population has occurred,2
the question of reapportionment and what to do about it had be-
come one of great importance. In November, 1960, apportionments
of 30 state legislatures had been challenged in state and federal courts 3
In addition, ten cases of an electoral character are presently on the
docket of the Supreme Court of the United States.4
Apart from the legal implications and mysteries created by the
Supreme Court in deciding Baker v. Carr, this decision, that the
Federal courts have a permissible and necessary role to perform in
assuring constitutional representation at the state level under the
fourteenth amendment, illustrates a modern political fact of trans-
cending importance. The fact is that state governments now must be
responsive to recurring demands for relief from long-standing dis-
criminatory practices in the apportionment of legislative seats. Of
particular significance is the additional fact that in the future the
question of reapportionment of state legislatures will arise period-
ically, the frequency depending upon the different state constitutions.
Reaffirmation of these facts by the. Baker case will alone assure this
decision a high rank in historical importance.
Public attention has been focused on the issue of reapportionment
1369 U.S. 186 (1962).2 The redistribution of Kentucky s population dunng the last two decades is
illustrative of that occurring throughout the country. Although this state s popu-
lation, as a whole has only increased about 200,000 since 1940, its urban popula-
tion has increased, 40.9 per cent- during tis period, while its rural population has
declined 11.3 per cent. In 1940, the urbamzed areas contained only 29.8 per cent
of the states population, in 1960, 44.5 per cent. This population shift has re-
sulted in a loss of total population to 87 of the 120 Kentucky counties. Bureau
of The Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1 1960 Census of Population 19-9,
"19-10 (1961); Bureau of Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1 1950 Census of
Population 17-7, 17-8 (1951).
3Grey v. Sanders, 83 Sup. Ct. 801, 809 (1963) (dissent).
4Wesberry v. Sanders, No. 507, Ga., Reynolds v. Sims, No. 508, Ala.,
Beadle v. Scholle, No. 517, Mich., WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, No. 460, N.Y., Vann
v. Frink, No. 540, Ala., Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes,
No. 554, Md., McConnell v. Fink, No. 610, Ala., Price v. Moss, No. 688, Okla.,
Oklahoma Farm Bureau v. Moss, No. 689, Okla., Davis v. Mann, No. 797, Va.
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through the press, greatly accelerating the prospect of relief from
grossly disproportionate representation in all states.5 And no state is
completely immune to this rapidly developing public question: How
must the state legislature be reapportioned to comply with the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment? Treating this ques-
tion as it relates to Kentucky, this note, in its first two parts, explains
briefly the Baker case and the Kentucky legal history of reapportion-
ment. The third and fourth parts are concerned with the require-
ments of the Kentucky constitution and the known meanings of the
fourteenth amendment as it is now being defined.
Fundamentals of Baker v. Carr
The Baker case was instituted on behalf of all eligible voters of
Tennessee who were suffering debasement of their vote as a result
of the state legislature's failure to reapportion itself every ten years in
complicance with a constitutional mandate. 6 This inaction by the
legislature, accompanied by substantial growth and redistribution
of the state's population, had resulted in disparity in popular repre-
sentation between the largest and smallest senatorial districts of about
five to one; the corresponding ratio between the largest and smallest
house districts was about eighteen to one.7 The district court dis-
missed the suit, resting its decision upon two grounds, lack of juns-
diction over the subject matter and lack of a justiciable cause of
action.8 In reversing this decision, the Supreme Court held only that:
(a) the district court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter; (b)
the appellants had standing to challenge the Tennessee apportionment
statutes; and (c) a justiciable cause of action had been stated upon
which appellants would be entitled to appropriate relief.9 In addi-
tion to these three fundamental points, which deal with the procedural
aspects of bringing the legislative apportionment question into the
federal courts, the question of possible remedies contemplated by the
Supreme Court for correction of an unconstitutional apportionment
will be considered.
The basic source of federal jurisdiction is article III, section 2,
of the United States Constitution, which provides that the "judicial
5The disparities m popular representation that exast in the various state
senates range from 422 to 1 in California to 1.6 to 1 in Missouri. The disparities
m the lower houses of the state legislatures range from 873 to 1 in Vermont to
2.1 to 1 in Hawaii. The corresponding ratios in Kentucky, before this most recent
statute, were 2.9 to 1 in the Senate and 6 to 1 in the House. National Municipal
League, Compendium On Legislative Apportionment (2d ed. 1962).
6 Tenn. Const. art. II, §4.7 Baker v. Carr, 869 U.S. 186, 275 (1962) (dissent).8 Baker v. Carr, 179 F Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
9 Baker v. Carr, 869 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1962).
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Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity," arsing under the
Constitution and the laws of the United States. This provision, not
being self-executing, requires congressional implementation before
jurisdiction is conferred on the federal district courtsO The Supreme
Court in Baker ruled that Congress had exercised its power to confer
jurisdiction of the reapportionment question in 28 U.S.C. §1343 (3),"
and that unless the appellant's claim was so "unsubstantial as to be
absolutely devoid of merit,"'12 or "frivolous,"' 3 the trial court had
erred in dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The lower
tribunal itself had stated that there was merit in the appellants'
allegation that the grossly unequal representation in Tennessee's leg-
islature denied them equal protection of the laws. The Supreme
Court, therefore, experienced no difficulty in finding a "substantial"
and "non-frivolous" claim upon which to hinge federal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court's finding that appellants had the necessary
standing to challenge the existing apportionment in Tennessee was
given very concise treatment. Their interest in obtaining an equal
vote for themselves in state legislative policy was thought to be a
sufficient "personal stake in the outcome."'14 of the controversy to
assure the necessary adversity for deciding such a sweeping consti-
tutional issue.
The second reason given for dismissing Baker v. Carr in the lower
court was the inappropriateness of the reapportionment question for
judicial determination. Holding this issue a nonjusticiable "polit-
ical question," the lower court interpreted the Supreme Court deci-
sion of Colegrove v. Green15 as deciding that federal courts could not
intervene in this type of case to compel reapportionment. The Cole-
grove case contained three written opinions from the seven justices
who participated. Two of the opinions, expressing the views of six
1oE.g., Clucot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 808 U.S. 871
(1940); Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas and Pac. Ry. Co., 241 U.S. 295 (1916);
California ex rel. McColgan v. Bruce, 129 F 2d 421 (9th Cir. .1942), cert. deed,
817 U.S. 678 (1942).
"28 U.S.C. §1343(3) (1958), provides that "the district courts shall have
ongmal jurisdiction of any ctvil action authonzed by law to be commenced by
any person to redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, of
any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States. " (Emphasis added.) In 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1958), which provides
every citizen with relief from the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution, the Supreme Court found the necessary
authority to commence the reapportionment action.12 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 683 (1946), cited with approval in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962).
'3 Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904), cited
with approval in Baker v. Carr, supra note 12.
14 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
i5 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
[Vol. 51,
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members of the Court, resulted in an even split on whether congres-
sional redistricting presented a justiciable controversy. 16 The deciding
vote was cast by Mr. Justice Rutledge, who affirmed the lower court's
dismissal, but only because the remaining time before the forthcoming
elections made it extremely doubtful that the demanded relief could
be secured; his opinion clearly supported the view that congressional
reapportionment does present a justiciable controversy. In Baker,
the Supreme Court held not only that the district court had mis-
interpreted the Colegrove dectsion,17 but also that the basic elements
of a political question-a constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department, and a lack of judicial criteria
for resolving it-are not present in a legislative reapportionment suit.
Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, stated:
We have no question decided, or to be decided, by a political
branch of government coequal with this Court. Nor need the
appellants, m order to succeed in this action, ask the Court to enter
upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable stand-
ards are lacking. Judicial standards under the Equal Protection
Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to
courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to de-
termine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination
reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.iS
In failing to reach the merits of Tennessee's apportionment, the
Court does not elaborate at all on the "well developed and familiar"
standards of the fourteenth amendment of which it speaks.
After the apportionment of a particular state legislature has been
declared unconstitutional, what remedies are available to the courts
if that legislature should fail to enact a fair apportionment plan?19
The majority of the court in Baker thought it inappropriate to con-
sider the question.2o The language of the Court, however, clearly
indicates that the federal courts will take a more active role in
iSJustices Frankfurter, Burton, and Reed affirmed the dismissal on the
ground that the redistricting was a "political question." Id. at 552. Justices Black,
Douglas, and Murphy held for reversal on the ground that the issue was justi-
ciable. Id. at 566.17 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962).
is Id. at 226.
1 Several cases indicate that even if a legislative representation is found to
be an invidious discrimination, the federal courts will allow the state legislature
additional time to enact a far apportionment statute before imposing a judicial
remedy. See e.g., Baker v. Can, 206 F Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962); Toombs
v. Fortson, 205 F Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Sims v. Fink, 208 F Supp. 431
(M.D. Ala. 1962).2 0justice Brennen, speaking for the Court, merely stated that there was no
cause to doubt that the District Court would be able to fashion relief if viola-
tions of constitutional rights were found to exist. Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186,
198 (1962).
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apportionment issues than merely reviewing the constitutionality of
redistricting statutes.
Although the courts may become somewhat involved in what
Justice Frankfurter termed a "political thicket," 2 ' a court reappor-
tionment may well prove to be the most effective means of giving that
equality of representation demanded by the fourteenth amendment.
It would not be necessary for the court to make a final and complete
reapportionment, but, as suggested by Justice Clark, only to elim-
inate the most egregious discrimination, leaving final redistricting to
the newly created assembly.22 At least one federal district court has
adopted this remedy.23
A second possible remedy is to order an election-at-large. Un-
like the court reapportionment, this remedy is not intended as an end
in itself, but merely as a "spur to legislative action."24 Admittedly,
the election-at-large may not be politically desirable since it violates the
vital political principle of affording some influence in legislative
policy to those governmental subdivisions with only a small number
of people. But historical evidence indicates that ordering this rem-
edy does provide the necessary stimulus for legislative action.25 This
fact alone has motivated some state courts to adopt this remedy.26
Kentucky Historical Background
As early as 1907, the Kentucky Court of Appeals adopted in part
the same view recently taken by the Supreme Court in the Baker
case, that the constitutionality of legislative action in this area is a
proper question for judicial decision.27 The Kentucky court, how-
ever, avoided the correlative implication of Baker, that legislative
inaction requires judicial remedy. Since the adoption of the present
constitution in 1891, the Kentucky legislature has enacted six dis-
tricting statutes, the most recent in 1963. The first,28 third,29 and
21 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
22 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 260 (1962). Justice Clark suggests that the
stranglehold on the legislature could be released merely by consolidating the
smallest districts and awarding the seats released to those countries that are most
under-represented. This would permit a legislative enactment of a fair redistrictingplan.23 Sims v. Frink, 208 F Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
24 See Lewis, Legslative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 1057 (1958).
25See e.g., Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Smiley v. Holm, 285
U.S. 355 (1932); Hume v. Mahan, 1 F Supp. 142 (E.D. Ky. 1932).2 6 Stem v. General Assembly, 374 P. 2d 66, 73 (Colo. 1962) (dissent);
Scholle v. Hare, 116 N.W 2d 350 (Mich. 1962).27 Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W 865 (1907).
2 8 Kentucky Acts ch. 235 (1891-1893).29 Kentucky Acts ch. 45 (1918).
[Vol. 51,
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fifth,30 of these acts were not challenged in the courts. The second31
and fourth3 2 were held unconstitutional under section 33 of the Ken-
tucky constitution. These decisions provide the judicial view of
Kentucky constitutional standards for reapportionment.
In the first case, Ragland v. Anderson,33 the court of appeals
held that an apportionment resulting in a population disparity of
seven to one between given districts lacked the equality of represen-
tation required by section 33. In so doing, the court established a
general standard for equality representation:
All that the Constitution requires is that equality in the representa-
tion of the State which an ordinary knowledge of its population and
a sense of common justice would suggest. 'If exactness cannot,
from the nature -of things, be attained, then the nearest practical
approach to exactness ought to be made.'34
Although this case establishes historically a standard for constitutional
representation in Kentucky, these extremes offer little practical help
to a federal court in passing on the validity of a redistricting plan
under the fourteenth amendment. The real problem in a modem
context is to define what is meant by "the nearest practical approach
to exactness."
As will be pointed out subsequently, although section 33 of the
Kentucky constitution establishes population as the proper criterion
for apportionment, it hedges this principle with various subsidiary
provisions designed to maintain the county as a representative unit,
including a requirement that not more than two counties may be
joined to form a legislative district. The treatment of this provision
in the Ragland case has proven to be of more than passing his-
torical interest, since questions concerning its meaning and effect were
interjected into the Kentucky reapportionment issue, and ultimately
decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
In holding the apportionment act of 1906 unconstitutional on the
grounds that equality of representation based on population was not
achieved, the court in Ragland said unequivocally that more than two
counties could be joined to form a district, provided "it be necessary
in order to effectuate that equality of representation which the spirit
of the whole section so imperatively demands." 35 The two-county
rule in section 33 provides:
8o Ky. Rev. Stat. §6.010.
31 Kentucky Acts ch. 189 (1906).
32 Kentucky Acts ch. 147 (1930).
33 125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W 865 (1907).
34 Id. at 158, 100 S.W at 869.
35 Id. at 161-62, 100 S.W at 870.
19631 NOTES
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Not more than two counties shall be ]omted to form a representa-
tive district; Provided, in doing so the principle requiring every dis-
tnct to be as nearly equal in population as may be shall not be
violated. (Emphasis added).
This dictum in Ragland was compelled by the specific wording of
section 33, and left little or no doubt as to the view of the Kentucky
court on this point. Then in January, 1963, the court of appeals,
in deciding Combs v. Matthews,3 6 adopted the dictum of Ragland,
and held that the Kentucky constitution does not limit representa-
tive districts to two counties.
Stzglitz v. Schardien3 7 is the only other case in which the court of
appeals has spoken clearly on the constitutionality of a districting
act under section 33. Under the acts involved in this case the aver-
age population in the twelve smallest representative districts was
12,412, while the average population in the twelve largest districts
was 46,434. In some of the senatorial districts there were more than
three times as many people as in others. The court in declaring the
acts unconstitutional, reaffirmed strongly the reasomng of the Rag-
land case, and said:
It is obvious on the face of the figures that no attempt was made
to redistrict into districts as nearly equal as may be.
The Constitution is not concerned with election returns, but
contemplates equal representation based upon population and tern-
tory. Its requirements may not be satisfied with less than such
equality of representation as common lustice and ordinary knowledge
of our territory and population would suggest.3 8 (Emphasis added.)
Both the Ragland and Sttglitz decisions support the conclusion
that Kentucky constitutional policy, as set out in section 33, demands
apportionment according to population which will meet a standard
of "common justice" and "ordinary knowledge." This is very much
in line with the meaning of the fourteenth amendment as it is now
being defined, and strongly suggests that a federal court is not likely
to strike down a repportionment plan for Kentucky which lives up
to the spirit of section 33.
Kentucky's Redistricting Criteria
There are basic causes for inequalities in legislative representation
other than the mere growth and redistribution of population. In
fact most state constitutions require reapportionment at intervals suf-
ficiently frequent to compensate for the ordinary shifts in-population.
If under-representation exists, it results either from failure of the
86364 S.W 2d 647 (Ky. 1963).
37239 Ky. 799, 40 S.W 2d 315 (1931).8 Id. at 806, 812, 40 S.W 2d at 319, 321,
[Vol. 51,
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legislature to comply with the state constitutional mandate to period-
ically reapportion the state, or from the inherent inequalities in
the provisions of the state constitution which establish the redistrict-
ing formula. Since Baker v. Carr clearly implies that continued failure
of a legislature to comply with the state constitutional mandate to
redistrict is invidious discrimination, the alternative practical issue
is whether existing state policy as expressed in the constitutional re-
districting criteria violates the fourteenth amendment. Determination
of this issue in a particular state necessarily calls for close scrutiny of
the relevant constitutional provisions and their evaluation in terms
of the federal equal protection clause.
The provisions of section 33 of the Kentucky constitution are
similar to those found in the constitutions of a great many other
states.s Aside from the provision that the state shall be divided into
thirty-eight senatorial districts, and one hundred representative
districts, 40 the distrcting criteria of section 33 fall into two cate-
gories, each composed of three specific provisions. The first category
requirements are: (a) the districts shall be "as nearly equal in popu-
lation as may be;" (b) the state shall be redistricted every ten years;
and (c) any advantage resulting from unavoidable inequalities shall be
given the districts with the largest territory. Since the clear purpose
of these particular provisions is achievement of "equal" representa-
tion, their constitutionality, as such, ought not be questionable.
The second category requirements are: (a) "not more than two
counties shall be joined together to form a Representative District:
Provided, In doing so the principle requiring every district to be as
nearly equal in population as may be shall not be violated;" 4i (b)
no part of a county shall be added to another county in forming a dis-
trict; and (c) the counties forming a district shall be contiguous. In
terms of purpose, these requirements obviously were designed to pre-
serve the county unit in the districting and redistricting processes.
When read as a whole, section 33 establishes population as the
principal criterion for apportionment of seats in the Kentucky legis-
lature. The effectiveness of this factor in achieving equal representa-
tion is substantially reduced by the criteria requirng strict observance
39 For a very good comparison of the districting and redistricting provisions
of the various state constitutions, see Durfee, Apportionment of Representatives
in the Legislature: A Study of State Constitutions, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 1091 (1945).4 0 This proviso of section 33 along with section 35 of the state constitution
make it clear that an increase in the membership of the Kentucky legislature can
be achieved only by a constitutional amendment.
41 No comparable limitation on senatorial districts is contained in the Ken-
tucky constitution, therefore, the "two-county rule" applies only to represen-
tative districts.
1963] NOTFs
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of county lines. While tis fact alone should not make the consti-
tutionality of the second category provisions doubtful under the equal
protection clause, it is apparent that full compliance with these
limitations prevents perfection in popular representation. This is
especially true in Kentucky since the maximum number of legisla-
tors is also constitutionally fixed. The courts, state and federal, have
held repeatedly, as a general proposition, that absolute equality, or
"mathematical perfection, is not required,42 but have provided little
or no concrete instruction as to the permissible inequalities allowed
under the fourteenth amendment. It has been said that state policy
in this connection must be "reasonable" and must avoid "invidious
discrimination." 43 Just what this means in fact, when state policy is
constitutionally expressed in terms of specific county umt limitations
on the population criterion, is the narrow and difficult question which
lies at the heart of an evaluation of section 33.
The majority of the Supreme Court disavowed any intention to
reach the merits of this and similar questions in the Baker case. An
examination of Justice Clark's concurring opimon, m connection
with similar county unit provisions of the Tennessee constitution,
however, suggests strongly that at least two of the second category
requirements of section 33 do not violate the fourteenth amendment.
The relevant Tennessee constitutional provisions at issue in Baker
established a maximum limitation on the number of legislators for
the entire state,44 required that all counties in multi-county districts
be adjoining,45 and provided that no county could be divided m
forming a district.48 In spite of the fact that they necessarily resulted
in some inequality, Justice Clark found the last two provisions to be
reasonable factors in Tennessee's apportionment plan. He said:
It is true that the apportionment policy incorporated in Ten-
nessee s Constitution, i.e., statewide numerical equality of repre-
sentation with certain minor qualifications, is a rational one. On a
county-by-county comparison a districting plan based thereon nat-
urally will have disparities in representation due to the qualifications.
4 2 E.g., Baker v. Cart, 869 U.S. 186, 260 (1962) (concurring opinion);
Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Sims v. Frink, 208 F
Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962); Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 799, 40 S.W 2d 315
(1931); Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W 865 (1907).
43 E.g., Baker v. Cart, supra note 42, at 258; Sanders v. Gray, 203 F Supp.
158, 167 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Caesar v. Williams, 371 P. 2d 241, 255 (Idaho 1962);
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 180 A. 2d 656, 668 (Md.
1962).
44 "The number of Representatives shall never exceed ninety-nine.
Tenn. Const. art. 2, §5. "The number of Senators shall not exceed one-third
the number of representatives. "Tenn. Const. art. 2, §6.45 Tenn. Const. art. 2, §6.
46 Ibzd.
[Vol. 51,
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But this to my mind does not raise constitutional problems, for the
overall policy is reasonable.47
Analysis of the litigation stimulated by Baker v. Carr not only sup-
ports the conclusion derived from Justice Clark's reasoning, but
also seems to indicate that compliance in full with the provisions of
section 33 is all that is needed for a fair apportionment of the Ken-
tucky legislature.
In Sims v. Frmnk,48 a federal case involving Alabama's legislative
representation, the court declared the existing apportionment to be
an "invidious discrimination" and violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Alabama constitution, in addition to requiring that sen-
atonal districts shall be as nearly equal in population as possible,
provides that no county shall be divided between two districts and
that all counties in the same district shall be contiguous. 49 The fed-
eral district court stated that this criteria did not offend the four-
teenth amendment, and that if he constitutional formula had been
fully complied with, no valid objection could have been made "under
the equal protection clause or any other part of the Constitution of
the United States." 50
Since Alabama, like Kentucky, places a limitation on the maximum
number of representatives, 51 another significant factor in the Sims
case is the validity attributed to the constitutional provision that
"each county shall be entitled to at least one representative." 52 This
provision is comparable of the requirement of section 33 of the Ken-
tucky constitution that not more than two counties may be joined
together to form one district. In terms of purpose both are designed
to provide some voice in legislative policy to those governmental
units with relatively few people. As stated earlier, the language of
section 33, in connection with the cases of Ragland v. Anderson5s and
Combs v. Matthews 54 leaves no doubt but that more than two coun-
ties can be joined in forming a representative district. But, even if
section 33 had been construed to prohibit the joining of more than
two counties into one district, the conclusion to be drawn from the
implications of Sims v. Frink is that even then the provision would
47 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 283-84 (1962). The conclusion of Justice
Clark that an "invidious discrimination" did exist m Tennessee s representation
was based prncipally upon the failure of the legislature to reapportion itself every
ten years m accordance with its constitutional mandate.
48208 F Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962).49 Ala. Const. art. IX, §200.
G0 Sims v. Frnk, 208 F Supp. 431 ....... (M.D. Ala. 1962).
51 Ala. Const. art. IX, §198.52 Ala. Const. art IX, §199.
53 125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W 865 (1907).
54 364 S.W 2d 647 (Ky. 1963).
1963] NoT- s
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have been constitutional. Since the two-county rule, so construed,
would have provided that each two-county district would have one
representative, the inequality resulting from this rule would have
been of a lesser degree than from the Alabama provision giving one
representative to each county. The two-county rule would have been
more constitutional than the Alabama rule to which validity has
already been attributed.
A result contrary to Sims has been reached in the reapportion-
ment litigation of Rhode Island.55 The constitution of Rhode Island
fixes the number of representatives at one hundred, and provides for
at least one representative for every city and town, without regard to
population. 56 In passing upon the constitutionality of these provi-
sions the Supreme Court of Rhode Island stated:
We are constrained to conclude that the limitation of one
hundred members and the securing of representation to each munici-
pality, taken together, is an apportionment formula which when fol-
lowed results in a demal of equal protection within the meaning of
Article XIV of amendments as laid down by the United States Su-
preme Court. 57
As subsequent discussion indicates, the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment in regard to legislative reapportionment has not been
"laid down" by the Supreme Court with the clarity seemingly ex-
pressed by the Rhode Island court. And no federal court has given
any indication that constitutional provisions such as the two in-
volved in the Rhode Island case are irrational per se. The only defi-
nite standard made thus far by the Supreme Court is that a dis-
tricting formula with a rational design does not violate the federal
constitution.
Equal Representation Under The Fourteenth Amendment
In holding that federal courts can review the constitutionality of
legislative representation, the Supreme Court has indicated that some
apportionments can be so unfair as to violate the equal protection
clause. The Court, however, has declined to say just how unrepre-
sentative a state legislature must be in order that its apportionment
be vulnerable. Obviously, some slight differences in population among
the senatorial and representative districts of a state will not render
its apportionment unconstitutional. But, in formulating a redistrict-
ing plan, how is the state legislature to determine when these dif-
ferences pass the allowable limits of the fourteenth amendment? Al-
55 Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A. 2d 296 (R.I. 1962).56 R.I. Const. art. XIII, §1.
57 Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A. 2d 296, 302 (R.I. 1962).
[Vol. 51,
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though this question has not been answered with certainty, the sev-
eral opinions of Baker v. Carr, and subsequent decisions stimulated
by this landmark ruling, offer some suggestion of the standard required
to satisfy the federal constitution. The purpose of thus section of the
note is to analyze these decisions, and to draw some conclusion as to
what is a "constitutional representation" as viewed by federal and
state courts.
In spite of the fact that equal protection of the laws is said to be
"a pledge of the protection of equal laws,"58 the Supreme Court,
long before Baker, made it dear that legislative classification is per-
missible under the fourteenth amendment.59 The criteria established
by the Court for determining the constitutionality of classification
is set forth in the case of Walters v. City of St. Lous.6o0 As stated by
the Court in that case:
Equal protection does not require identity of treatment. It only
requires that classification rest on real and not feigned differences,
that the distinction have some relevance to the purpose for which
the classification is made, and that for the different treatment be not
so disparate, relative to the difference m classification, as to be
wholly arbitrary. 61
Justice Brennen must have had this well-recogmzed standard62 in
mind when he stated in Baker, not that legislative districts have to be
equal in population, but only that "arbitrary and capricious" district-
ing which reflects no policy violates the federal constitution.63 Essen-
tially the same policy is espoused in the concurring opinions of jus-
tices Clark and Douglas, except that the prohibition of the equal
protection clause is phrased in terms of "invidious discrimination."
Under the Baker policy, two factors must exist before a legislative
apportionment will be declared unconstitutional by the courts. First,
there must exist some inequality in popular representation, and sec-
ond, that inequality must have resulted from action or inaction by the
state, which, in Justice Brennen's words, is arbitrary and capricious."
58yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
59 E.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); New
York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1938); Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea Co. v. Crasjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937); Dominion Hotel, Inc. v. Ari-
zona, 249 U.S. 265 (1919).
60347 U.S. 231 (1954).
61 Id. at 237.62 See text accompanying note 18, supra.63 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 236 (1962).64 See e.g., Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W 2d 350, 381 (1962)
where it was stated that even if there were legitimate reasons for the classifica-
tion, "the wide disparity in the ratio of population between the most populous
and the least popuous districts a disparity neither minor nor unavoidable,
would require our finding the amendments invidiously discriminatory in viola-
tion of the equality clause, and therefore, void. "
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Since mathematical equality of legislative districts is not required,
what degree of inequality is necessary to bring a state's apportionment
into the realm of invidious discrimination? In spite of the obvious
difficulty in establishing a rigid standard for determining this ques-
tion, the most recent decision in the Michigan litigation, Scholle v.
Hare,65 originated a mathematically precise formula by winch to judge
when population disparity surpasses the permissible limits of the four-
teenth amendment. As stated by the Supreme Court of Michigan:
When a legislative apportionment provides districts having more
than double the population of others, the constitutional range of
discretion is violated. This is not to say that less than such 2 to I
ratio is constitutionally good. It is only to say that peril ends and
disaster occurs when that line is crossed.66
This judicial standard leaves little discretion in the legislature for
consideration of geographic, economic, social, and other interests, m.
establishing a redistricting plan. For this reason it would seem to be
too stringent for application of such a broad constitutional concept
as the equal protection of the laws. In the words of a federal district
court in Virginia:
While predominant, population is not m our opinion the sole or
definitive measure of districts when taken by the Equal Protection
Clause. Compactness and contiguity of the territory, community of
interests of the people, observance of natural lines, and conformity
to historical divisions, such as county lines, for example, are all to
be noticed m assaying the justness of the apportionment. 67
The second element necessary under the Baker principles for an
unconstitutional apportionment is action or inaction by the state
which is arbitrary or capricious. In the preceding part of this note,
this element was discussed as it relates to constitutional provisions
(especially those of the Kentucky constitution), winch are designed
to preserve the county unit in the redistricting process. It was con-
cluded that these provisions as such are not arbitrary or capricious.
To complete the analysis of the "arbitrary or capricious" element of
Baker, requires a determination of whether a state may have as its
objective in apportioning one of the houses of its legislature, the
dilution of voting strength of some citizens in favor of others.
Tennessee's constitution contains a provision affording repre-
sentation to those governmental units winch do not have sufficient
population to equal a full ratio.68 In finding this provision to be
constitutional, the federal district court stated:
65367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W 2d 350 (1962).
66 Id. at-, 116 N.W 2d at 355.67 Mann v. Davis, 213 F Supp. 577, 584 (E.D. Va. 1962).68 Tenn. Const. art. 2, §5.
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Such a state plan for distribution of legislative strength, at least
in one house of a bicameral legislature, cannot be characterized
as per se irrational or arbitrary. We find no basis for holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment precludes a state from enforcing
a policy which would give a measure of protection and recognition
to its less populous governmental units. 69
The implication of this case is that one house of a bicameral legis-
lature may be arranged in such a way as to give representation to each
of the governmental units of the state (counties, wards, parishes,
etc.), even if this requires districting solely on the basis of non-popu-
lation criteria. Direct authority for this proposition is available in
Toombs v. Fortson:70
[We do not find any authoritative decmon by the Supreme
Court that causes us to require that in order to give the voters
their constitutional rights the state legislature must be constituted
of two houses, both of which are elected according to popula-
tion.71 (Emphasis added.)
True, no authoritative decision exists requiring both houses of
a state legislature to be elected according to population. But, the
Supreme Court's decision in the Michigan litigation 72 contains some
implication of such a requirement. At the time of this decision, the
Michigan House of Representatives was apportioned on the basis
of population.7" Representation in the senate was based on geo-
graphical units which resulted in disproportionate representation
favoring rural areas.74 In Scholle v. Hare,75 an attack was made only
upon Michigan's senatorial representation. The Supreme Court of
Michigan promptly dismissed the suit. Four judges joined in an
opinion stating that the fourteenth amendment does not prohibit
a state from enacting provisions for electoral districts for one house
of the legislature which result in substantial inequality of popular
representation in that house. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States, the judgment was vacated in a per curiam opinion,
and the case "remained to the Supreme Court of Michigan for fur-
ther consideration in light of Baker v. Car-. "76 Does this amount to
a determination that a cause of action had been stated in the state
court which demanded relief? If so, then it stands for the proposition
that constitutional standards of the fourteenth amendment require
that both houses of a bicameral legislature be apportioned on the
69 Baker v. Carr, 206 F Supp. 341, 345 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
70 205 F Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
71 Id. at 257.
72 Scholle v. Hare, 869 U.S. 429 (1962).
73 Mich. Const. art. V §3.
74 Mich. Const. art. V §2.
75 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W 2d 63 (1960).
76 Scholle v. Hare, 869 U.S. 429 (1962).
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basis of population. In a subsequent case, WMCA, Inc. v. Simon,7T
the Supreme Court again remanded a reapportionment case to be
considered in light of Baker v. Carr In doing so, the Court indicated
that it was a .well-established practice to remand cases to be con-
sidered in light of a subsequent Supreme Court decision, so that the
lower court would have first opportunity to pass on the merits. This
seems to indicate that the Court made no consideration whatsoever
as to whether a cause of action had been stated in Scholle v. Hare.
After Scholle was remanded to the Michigan court, the question
of whether a state may have as its policy the dilution of voting strength
of some citizens in favor of others was sidestepped. The court stated
merely that the geographical classification, as made, "was arbitrary,
discriminatory, and without reasonable or just relation to the
electoral process."78 The ultimate answer to whether both houses of
a bicameral legislature must be apportioned according to population
may depend upon the final decision in the Scholle case, which is
once again pending before the Supreme Court of the Umted States.
The meaning of the fourteenth amendment, so far as it applies
to the reapportionment issue, is still somewhat obscure. It seems
clear that if the redistricting formula contained in a state constitution
is based upon reasonable factors, the formula itself will satisfy the
fourteenth amendment, even though some inequality in popular
representation is inevitable. On the other hand, if the redistricting
formula of a state is irrational, or if the legislature fails to comply
with the constitutional mandate to redistrict, the legislative repre-
sentation of that state is certain to fall within the category of arbi-
trary and capricious state action.
Robert Lawson
7782 Sup. Ct. 1234 (1962).7 8 Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176 ......., 116 N.W 2d 350, 354 (1962).
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